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Abstract
 New and young businesses—as opposed to small 
businesses generally—play an outsized role in net 
job creation in the United States. But not all new 
businesses are the same—the substantial majority of 
nascent entrepreneurs do not intend to grow their 
businesses significantly or innovate, and many more 
never do. Differentiating growth-oriented “startups” 
from the rest of young businesses is an important 
distinction that has been underrepresented in 
research on business dynamics and in small business 
policy.
 To advance the conversation, we contrast business 
and job creation dynamics in the entire U.S. private 
sector with the innovative high-tech sector—defined 
here as the group of industries with very high 
shares of employees in the STEM fields of science, 
technology, engineering, and math. We highlight 
these differences at the national level, as well as 
detailing regions throughout the country where 
high-tech startups are being formed each year. The 
major findings include:
•	 The	high-tech	sector	and	the	information	and	
communications technology (ICT) segment 
of high-tech are important contributors to 
entrepreneurship in the U.S. economy. During 
the last three decades, the high-tech sector 
was 23 percent more likely and ICT 48 percent 
more likely than the private sector as a whole to 
witness a new business formation.
•	 High-tech	firm	births	were	69	percent	higher	 
in	2011	compared	with	1980;	they	were	 
210	percent	higher	for	ICT	and	9	percent	 
lower for the private sector as a whole during 
the same period. This is important because the 
productivity growth and job creation unleashed 
by these new and young firms—aged less than 
five years—require a continual flow of births 
each year.
•	 Of	new	and	young	firms,	high-tech	companies	
play	an	outsized	role	in	job	creation.	High-
tech businesses start lean but grow rapidly 
in the early years, and their job creation is so 
robust that it offsets job losses from early-stage 
business failures. This is a key distinction from 
young firms across the entire private sector, 
where net job losses resulting from the high rate 
of early-stage failures are substantial.
•	 Young	firms	exhibit	an	“up-or-out”	dynamic,	
where they tend to either fail or grow rapidly 
in the early years. The job-creating strength of 
surviving young firms, while strong for young 
businesses across the private sector as a whole, 
is especially distinct for high-tech startups: the 
net job creation rate of these surviving young 
firms is twice as robust.
•	 High-tech	and	ICT	firm	formations	are	becoming	
increasingly geographically dispersed. As 
technological advancement allows for the 
production of high-tech goods and services in 
a wider set of areas, many regions are catching 
up. The opposite has been true for the private 
sector as a whole, where new business growth 
has been occurring most in regions with already 
higher rates of new business formation.
Introduction
 Recent research highlights the importance of 
new and young businesses—as opposed to small 
businesses generally—to job creation in the United 
States. To summarize, while older and larger firms 
are the major source of employment levels, it is new 
and young businesses that are the primary source of 
net new jobs.1 In fact, outside of new businesses, job 
creation in the United States has been negative over 
the last three decades.2 This is because businesses 
aged one year or more, as a group, subtracted jobs 
from the economy. In other words, the forces of 
job destruction were greater than the forces of job 
creation for businesses over one year old as a group. 
 A key limitation to this research has been that 
publicly available business dynamics data do 
not allow a clear distinction between growth-
oriented “startups” and other new businesses.3 
1. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young,” NBER Working Paper 16300; Kane (2010), “The Importance of Startups 
in Job Creation and Job Destruction,” Kauffman Foundation; and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2009), “Jobs Created from Business Startups in the United States,” 
Kauffman Foundation.
2. U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics; author’s calculations by Engine.
3. One important exception is Stangler (2010), “High-Growth Firms and the Future of the American Economy,” Kauffman Foundation; and for use of alternative data to 
analyze high-growth firms, see Motoyama, et al. (2012), “The Ascent of America’s High-Growth Companies,” Kauffman Foundation.
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This distinction is important because painting all 
entrepreneurs with the same broad brush is an 
oversimplification.4 It also has important implications 
for public policy.5 Few new businesses will ever 
grow substantially or innovate. In fact, most nascent 
entrepreneurs actually report having no desire to 
build high-growth businesses. Instead, they intend 
to	provide	existing	services	to	an	existing	customer	
base, and the decision to form a new business  
is driven more by non-economic reasons than  
on whether to grow a business or create a  
new market.6 
	 This	report	moves	the	existing	body	of	research	
forward by contrasting job creation and business 
formation dynamics in the entire U.S. private sector 
with those in the high-tech sector—defined here 
as the group of industries with very high shares of 
employees in the STEM fields of science, technology, 
engineering, and math. By doing so, we show 
how job creation emanating from startups in an 
innovative sector, with generally growth-oriented 
firms, behaves differently from new businesses 
across the economy as a whole—namely that new 
and young firms in this sector play an especially 
outsized role in net job creation.
 We also show that high-tech startups are being 
founded across the country, fueling local and 
national economic growth. While well-known high-
tech hubs like San Francisco, Silicon Valley, Seattle, 
Boston, and Austin still are important sources of 
technology entrepreneurship, we find that high-
tech startups are a pervasive force in communities 
throughout the country. In other words, recent 
growth in high-tech startups is not simply a “tech 
center” phenomenon.
National Business 
Dynamics
 To identify business and employment dynamics 
across the entire U.S. private sector, we analyzed 
the public-use files of the Census Bureau’s Business 
Dynamics Statistics (BDS) database. The BDS is the 
definitive publicly available dataset that measures 
business and employment dynamics in the United 
States. Unlike other government data sources, the 
BDS ties business establishments (physical locations 
of business activity) back to the parent firm (in the 
case of multi-establishment enterprises).7 
	 This	is	critical	because	decisions	to	expand,	
contract, open, or close are made at an enterprise-
wide level. Much as it wouldn’t be appropriate to 
term a small business establishment belonging to a 
large corporation a “small business,” it also would 
be	a	misnomer	to	call	an	existing	business’s	new	
location a “new business” or a “startup.”
	 For	example,	if	Starbucks	hires	a	few	dozen	
workers to open a new store in Chicago, the BDS 
would correctly classify that as a new business 
establishment of an old and large firm based in 
Seattle.	Other	data	sources	may	consider	that	a	
small business, and others still would consider that 
a new business. While it is important to attribute 
the new business establishment and the related 
job creation to Chicago, it is equally important to 
classify	the	action	as	an	existing	business	expansion	
rather than a new firm birth. The BDS solves this 
limitation.8 
 In addition to the public-use BDS data covering 
the entire private sector, a special tabulation of that 
data was provided to us by the Census Bureau for 
the high-tech sector—defined here as the group of 
industries with very high shares of workers in the 
STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, and 
math	(see	Appendix	1).
 Ten of the fourteen high-tech industries can 
be classified as information and communications 
technology (ICT), while the remaining four are in 
the disparate fields of pharmaceuticals, aerospace, 
engineering services, and scientific research and 
development. Throughout this report, the high-
tech sector and the ICT segment of high-tech will 
be benchmarked against the entire private sector. 
Measures involving rates, percentages, and densities 
4. For a broader discussion, see Aulet and Murray (2013), “A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs: Understanding the Differences in the Types of Entrepreneurship in the 
Economy,” Kauffman Foundation.
5. Chatterji (2012), “Why Washington Has it Wrong on Small Business,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2012.
6. Hurst and Pugsley (2011), “What Do Small Businesses Do?” NBER Working Paper No. 17041.
7. Another important distinction is that these data are based on administrative records of the U.S. government.
8. For more on the BDS, see U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies, Business Dynamics Statistics, http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/.
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will be implemented to normalize for the different 
sizes of these three segments of the U.S. economy.
Job Creation and Firm Age
 Though the substantial majority of employment 
existed	in	older	firms	during	the	past	few	decades	
(see	Appendix	2),	this	report	looks	to	the	sources	of	
new jobs. In particular, we look at net job creation: 
gross job creation (through business births and 
expansions)	minus	gross	job	destruction	(through	
business closures and contractions). Employment 
changes are the net result of that dynamic process.9 
In other words, these flows are what drive future 
job growth.
	 As	mentioned	before,	the	body	of	existing	
research has made it clear that outside of new 
firms—those aged less than one year—job creation 
as a whole has been negative over the past two 
decades. This is because the overall forces of job 
destruction were greater than the forces of job 
creation. Figure 1 illustrates this point, comparing 
that trend in the private sector with the net job 
creation patterns in the high-tech and ICT sectors.
 New firms, by definition, can only add jobs so  
the	net	job	creation	rate	is	fixed	here	at	about	 
100 percent.10 But as Figure 1 also makes clear, 
there is an important distinction between net job 
creation for young firms—aged one to five years—
in high-tech and ICT versus the private sector as a 
whole: net job creation for young high-tech and ICT 
firms has been positive, while young firms across the 
entire private sector have shed jobs at a high rate. 
This finding is an important departure from the body 
of	existing	research	on	this	topic.
	 This	trend	somewhat	extends	to	medium-aged	
firms—aged	six	to	ten	years.	While	high-tech	and	
ICT firms overall shed jobs at a low rate, total 
private	sector	net	job	losses	were	more	than	six	
times greater. The trend is flipped for mature firms, 
however, with high-tech and ICT firms as a group 
cutting jobs at twice the rate of the private sector as 
a whole. 
 The significant net job losses for young firms 
across the entire private sector have been driven 
by the high early-stage failure rate. About half of 
all firms fail within their first five years—a trend 
9. Moving forward in this report, unless otherwise noted, the term “job creation” refers to “net job creation.”
10. It’s not exactly 100 percent because the rate is partially based on the prior year’s level, which varies from year to year.
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Figure 1: Average Annual Net Job Creation by Firm Age (1990–2011)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics and Special Tabulation; author’s calculations
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that has been remarkably consistent over time.11 
In short, the job destruction forces associated with 
firm failure have been strong enough to erase and 
exceed	any	job	gains	of	surviving	firms	that	grow	in	
the private sector as a whole.
 But what about the young companies that 
survive? At what rate do they create and destroy 
jobs? As it turns out, net job creation for surviving 
firms—after removing job destruction from 
failures—is quite robust. Earlier research has termed 
this the “up-or-out” dynamic: young firms tend 
either to fail or grow rapidly.12 
	 After	excluding	the	job	destruction	from	business	
exits,	Figure	2	confirms	that	net	job	creation	among	
existing	firms	is	strong	among	young	companies.	
This has been especially true for high-tech and ICT, 
where surviving young firms create jobs at twice 
the average rate across the entire private sector. For 
medium-age firms, net job creation rates are lower, 
but the rates for high-tech and ICT are about four 
times the rate for the private sector as a whole. 
Surviving mature firms in each of the three industrial 
segments subtract jobs overall, and high-tech and 
ICT firms do so at a higher rate than the rest of the 
private sector.
 Taken together, Figures 1 and 2, along with 
Appendix	2,	show	that,	while	older	firms	are	the	
major source of employment, new and young 
companies are responsible for net new jobs. This 
has been especially true for high-tech and ICT firms 
where job gains among young businesses have been 
strong enough to offset job losses from early-stage 
firm	failures.	However,	across	the	private	sector	as	 
a whole, early firm failures result in substantial net 
job destruction.
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Figure 2: 
Average Annual Net Job Creation at Surviving Businesses by Firm Age (1990–2011)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics and Special Tabulation; author’s calculations
11. Stangler (2009), “The Economic Future Just Happened,” Kauffman Foundation. Outside of an extraordinary period of a high rate of failures associated with the dot-
com bust, that trend has been similar for high-tech and ICT (see Appendix 2, Figures A3 and A4).
12. See Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young,” NBER Working Paper 16300; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 
(2009), “High Growth and Failure of Young Firms,” Kauffman Foundation.
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Figure 3: Average Firm Employment by Firm Age (1990–2011)
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Figure 3: Average Firm Employment by Firm Age (1990–2011)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics and Special Tabulation; author’s calculations
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics and Special Tabulation; author’s calculations
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 Even after removing the job destruction from 
business failures, young- and medium-aged high-
tech and ICT firms create jobs at a rate that is well 
in	excess	of	other	businesses—highlighting	the	
significant employment growth that occurs in the 
early years of companies. Illustrated differently, 
Figure 3 shows that average employment at high-
tech and ICT firms is higher than for the private 
sector as a whole beyond the year of birth.
 Recall too from Figures 1 and 2 that high-tech and 
ICT firms aged eleven years or more, as a group, are 
net job destroyers. This indicates that much of the 
substantial growth in average employment for high-
tech and ICT firms seen in Figure 3 is driven by a 
disproportionately small number of these businesses. 
Still, the overall job-creating power of young- and 
medium-aged high-tech and ICT firms is evident.
Business Formation and Job Creation
 Since net job creation at new and young firms 
relies on the continued formation of new firms each 
year,	Figures	4–6	show	new	business	formation	
patterns, job creation at new firms, and average 
employment at new businesses for the high-tech 
sector, the ICT subset of high-tech, and the U.S. 
private	sector	as	a	whole	between	1980	and	2011.13 
 Figure 4 reveals a few key insights. First, new 
business formation for the high-tech sector has 
grown rapidly over the last three decades, driven 
by	the	explosive	growth	in	the	ICT	segment.	
Some	of	this	growth	was	excessive	during	the	
dot-com boom, but has dissipated. These sectors 
also	experienced	sizeable	drops	during	the	Great	
Recession	of	2008	and	2009.	Still,	new	high-tech	
business	formations	were	up	69	percent	in	2011	
compared	with	1980,	while	ICT	increased	by	 
210 percent over the same period. Assuming the 
2011 rebound continued into 2012 and 2013,  
these sectors may have returned to levels of firm 
entry more aligned with longer-run trends.14 
 The same cannot be said of the private sector as a 
whole, where new firm formations were down  
13. Note that when looking at firms across a broader range of ages, we only examined data between 1990 and 2011 instead of between 1980 and 2011. This is 
because it isn’t possible to confirm the age of firms eleven or more years old until 1987, since the BDS data were first published in 1977.
14. For high-tech and related startup activity in recent years, see, for example: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2013), MoneyTree Report, Historical Trend Data; CB Insights 
(2013), Venture Capital Activity Report; Silicon Valley Bank, Angel Resource Institute, and CB Insights (2013), 2012 Halo Report: Angel Group Activity Year in Review; 
Silicon Valley Bank, Angel Resource Institute, and CB Insights (2013), Halo Report: Angel Group Update: Q1 2013; Silicon Valley Bank (2012, 2013), Startup Outlook.
T e c h  S t a r t s :  H i g h - T e c h n o l o g y  B u s i n e s s  F o r m a t i o n  a n d  J o b  C r e a t i o n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s 7
B u s i n e s s  F o r m a t i o n  a n d  J o b  C r e a t i o n
9	percent	in	2011	compared	with	1980—driven	
by the especially large declines during the latest 
recession. Despite this large drop, peak firm 
entry	was	just	24	percent	above	1980	levels,	
which	occurred	in	2006.	Since	2011,	the	limited	
information available indicates that the total 
private	sector	may	have	experienced	flat	to	modest	
increases in entrepreneurship.15
	 Second,	when	expressed	as	a	share	of	all	firms	in	
each sector, new business formation has consistently 
been higher for high-tech and ICT than for the 
private	sector	as	a	whole.	Over	this	three-decade	
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Figure 4a: New Firm (<1 yr.) Formation Levels (1980–2011)
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Figure 4b: New Firm (<1 yr.) Formation—Change versus 1980 (%)
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15. Fairlie (2013), “Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity (1996–2012),” Kauffman Foundation; and Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013), Business Employment 
Dyanmics Summary Fourth Quarter 2012.
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period, new firm formations were 23 percent more 
likely for high-tech and 48 percent more likely 
for ICT than for the private sector as a whole.16 
High-tech	and	ICT	firms	had	annual	new	business	
formation rates three to five percentage points 
higher than for the private sector on average.  
Some of this was driven by startup growth in the 
late-1990s	dot-com	boom,	but	even	excluding	 
those years, the firm formation rates are higher in 
these sectors.
	 However,	this	relationship	has	declined	over	time	
as the new business share of each sector has been 
steadily falling. In short, the impressive growth 
in firm entry for high-tech and ICT hasn’t been 
sufficient to keep up with sector growth overall. 
This is largely driven by the maturing of a sector 
that recently came of age and therefore had a 
disproportionally high share of young firms in the 
early years of our data. As evidence of this,  
26	percent	of	high-tech	firms	were	aged	eleven	
years	or	more	in	1990,	while	41	percent	were	in	
2011. For ICT, those numbers are 21 percent and  
33 percent. For the private sector as a whole,  
those shares were 35 percent and 47 percent,  
which marks a percentage increase of about half 
that of high-tech and ICT.
 It may also reflect an underlying decline in 
business dynamism and entrepreneurship. While 
this appears to be the case for the private sector as 
a whole, it is too soon to apply this conclusion to 
high-tech and ICT based on this information alone. 
This	is	a	non-trivial	matter	that	should	be	explored	
in future research, because the job creation and 
economic growth unleashed by new and young 
firms requires a continued flow of births each year.17 
 Moving to employment at new firms, Figures 5 
and	6	show	average	employment	levels	and	job	
creation measures for new businesses each year 
during the past few decades.
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Figure 4c: New Firm (<1 yr.) Formation Shares (1980–2011)
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16. High-tech accounted for 3.4 percent of all firms but 4.1 percent of new firms between 1980 and 2011. For ICT, those numbers were, respectively, 1.6 percent and 
2.4 percent.
17. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young,” NBER Working Paper 16300; Haltiwanger (2011), “Job Creation and Firm 
Dynamics in the U.S.,” Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 12, NBER.
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	 Taken	together,	Figures	5	and	6	provide	some	
important insights. First, the average employment 
level at new high-tech and ICT firms has been on 
a steady decline during the last three decades, 
peaking	between	six	and	nine	employees	in	the	early	
1980s	to	reach	about	4.5	employees	on	average	
in 2011. In other words, high-tech and ICT firms 
are starting smaller. The entire private sector, on 
the	other	hand,	has	held	steady	with	about	six	
employees on average at new firms.
	 Figure	6	shows	that,	despite	the	decline	in	average	
employment for high-tech and ICT, elevated levels 
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Figure 5: Average Employment at New Firms (<1 yr.) (1980–2011)
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Figure 6a: Employment at New Firms (<1 yr.) (1980–2011)
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of firm entry compared with three decades ago was 
sufficient to increase annual job creation at these 
new firms—in absolute levels—as a percentage 
change, and a share of total sector employment. 
This was much less pronounced in all of high-tech—
and in fact, held steady in certain places—compared 
with	ICT,	which	was	particularly	strong.	Overall,	the	
increase in new high-tech and ICT firm formations 
has come along with healthy doses of new jobs.
 The situation has been different for the private 
sector as a whole, where job creation at new firms 
essentially has been flat over the last three decades. 
Given	that	the	average	employment	size	at	new	
firms held steady with a slight increase by 2011, the 
lack of increased job creation from new firms can be 
attributed to the decline in firm formation. New firm 
employment has been declining as a share of overall 
employment as a result.
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Figure 6b: Employment at New Firms (<1 yr.)—Change versus 1980 (%)
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Figure 6c: Job Creation Contribution of New Firms (<1 yr.) (1980–2011)
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	 When	taken	in	context	with	the	job-creating	
potential of new and young firms seen in Figures 1 
to 4, we see a tale of two segments of the economy: 
the high-tech and ICT sectors, which create jobs 
at a high rate and contribute disproportionately to 
entrepreneurship, and the private sector as a whole, 
where business dynamism and job creation are on an 
overall decline.
Regional Business 
Dynamics
	 Next	we	turn	to	the	regional	dimensions	of	
business dynamics for high-tech and ICT. Since the 
detailed industry data required to analyze the high-
tech sector was not made available at geographic 
units smaller than for the entire United States, the 
BDS cannot be used for the regional analyses here. 
Instead, an alternative dataset is constructed.
 The National Establishment Time Series (NETS) 
is a privately produced dataset that links annual 
snapshots of Dun & Bradstreet data on U.S. business 
establishments	between	1990	and	2010.18 The result 
is an establishment-level longitudinal dataset with 
information on industry, geography, and parent-firm 
structure of businesses, at the level of detail required 
for the regional analyses in this report. 
 It is important to note that an apples-to-apples 
comparison between NETS and BDS data is not 
possible. The BDS is based on administrative 
government data covering all private-sector  
non-farm employers with paid employees. The  
Dun & Bradstreet data underlying NETS are based 
on private market research. As a result, the coverage 
and scope of the two are different.19 
 To compensate for the differences between the 
two datasets, certain adjustments were made to 
the NETS data.20 Still, two important differences 
persist here: business levels and formation rates 
generally are higher in the NETS relative to the BDS. 
Despite this, a systematic comparison of NETS and 
government sources indicates that the two reflect 
similar trends in business and employment dynamics 
over time.21 That is sufficient for our purposes here.
Startup Density
 After analyzing national trends of business and 
employment dynamics in the previous section, the 
following charts and tables show where new high-
tech and ICT firms are founded. Figures 7 and 8 
present a measure of startup density by comparing 
384 metropolitan areas in the United States in 2010, 
the latest year these data are available.22
 As a measure of startup density, we calculate 
location quotients for new high-tech and ICT firms. 
The location quotient measures the concentration 
of high-tech or ICT startups in a region relative to 
the average across the entire United States. More 
specifically, it places the ratio of high-tech (or ICT) 
firm births in a region to the population in the same 
region in the numerator, and that same ratio for 
the entire United States in the denominator. Values 
of one indicate that a region has the same density 
of startups as does the United States as a whole. 
Density measures greater than one indicate above-
average densities. The opposite is true for values less 
than one.
 The data provide a number of insights. First, 
each of the high-density metros has one of three 
characteristics, and some have a combination: they 
are well-known tech hubs or regions with highly 
skilled	workforces;	they	have	a	strong	defense	or	
aerospace	presence;	they	are	smaller	university	cities.	
This isn’t surprising, given the prevalence of high-
tech industries in those areas, and the high-tech 
entrepreneurship prevalent in college towns and 
cities with highly educated workforces.23 
18. For more on NETS, see http://youreconomy.org/downloads/NETSDatabaseDescription2011.pdf.
19. Two major coverage differences are that the BDS excludes non-employer firms and government establishments while NETS includes them, albeit seemingly to 
varying degrees. As a result, the scope of NETS is much broader than the BDS. For more on this, see Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), “Who Creates Jobs? 
Small vs. Large vs. Young,” NBER Working Paper 16300, at Footnote 9. Further, NETS data is initially published as preliminary and is subject to revision for a period of 
approximately three years after first publication (e.g., 2010 data may be revised through the 2013 release).
20. In particular, the self-employed were excluded (where possible). Overall, we expect high-tech and ICT firm levels and entry rates to be higher in our regional 
dataset than they would be if we had comparable BDS data. Still, the overall trends are likely to be similar.
21. Neumark, et al. (2005), “Employment Dynamics and Business Relocation: New Evidence from the National Establishment Time Series,” NBER Working Paper 
11647.
22. This report defines metros as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Metro Divisions (MDs) as determined by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Office of 
Management and Budget.
23. Hathaway (2012), “Technology Works: High-Tech Employment and Wages in the United States,” Bay Area Council Economic Institute; Chatterji, Glaeser, and 
Kerr (2013), “Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 19013; Hausman (2013), “University Innovation, Local Economic Growth, and 
Entrepreneurship,” Working Paper; Doms, Lewis, and Robb (2010), “Local Labor Force Education, New Business Characteristics, and Firm Performance,” Journal of 
Urban Economics 67:1.
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Figure 7: High-Tech Startup Density by Metro in 2010
High-Tech
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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Table 1: Top 25 Metros for High-Tech Startup Density (2010)
Metro Name Density Metro Name Density
Boulder, CO 6.3 Huntsville, AL 1.9
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 3.0 Provo-Orem, UT 1.9
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 2.6 Bend, OR 1.8
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA 2.4 Austin-Round Rock, TX 1.7
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 2.4 Missoula, MT 1.7
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 2.4 Grand Junction, CO 1.7
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 2.4 Sioux Falls, SD 1.7
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 2.3 Bethesda-Frederick-Rockville, MD 1.7
Colorado Springs, CO 2.3 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 1.6
Cheyenne, WY 2.0 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1.6
Salt Lake City, UT 2.0 Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 1.6
Corvallis, OR 2.0 Ames, IA 1.6
Raleigh-Cary, NC 1.9 53 Additional Metros > 1.0 --
United States 1.0 United States 1.0
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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 What may be surprising, however, is the 
magnitude of these densities—particularly at the 
top.	High-tech	startups	were	especially	prominent	
in the local economies of Boulder, Fort Collins-
Loveland,	Colorado	Springs,	and	Grand	Junction	in	
Colorado,	in	Corvallis	and	Bend	in	Oregon,	and	in	
Cheyenne,	Wyo.;	Huntsville,	Ala.;	Missoula,	Mont.;	
Sioux	Falls,	S.D.;	and	Ames,	Iowa.	Because	of	their	
small size, these eleven regions represented just  
2 percent of high-tech startups nationally, but their 
high densities illustrate the relative importance of 
high-tech startups to these local economies.
	 High-tech	startup	hubs	are	scattered	throughout	
the country, with leading metros coming from the 
Rocky Mountains, West Coast, Sunbelt, Midwest, 
Mid-Atlantic,	Southeast,	Northeast,	and	Great	
Plains. A wide-range of sizes is represented, too. 
These	twenty-five	metros	represent	19	percent	of	
new high-tech firms nationwide. Another fifty-three 
metros had high-tech startup densities greater 
than the average for the United States overall. For 
comparison, the twenty-five most active metros in 
terms of absolute levels of startups accounted for  
40 percent of high-tech startups nationwide.
 Figure 8 and Table 2 show similar data for the 
ICT segment of high-tech. There is a good deal of 
overlap between the top high-tech and ICT startup 
hubs, but there are some key differences—namely 
that there are fewer above-average density ICT 
startup metros than for all of high-tech. Recall that 
our broader definition of high-tech includes more 
geographically dispersed activities like aerospace, 
scientific research and development, and, especially, 
engineering services.24 
 Similar to before, many of the top twenty-five 
metros	here	are	small	in	size,	which	explains	why	
they represent just 20 percent of the level of new 
Figure 8: ICT High-Tech Startup Density by Metro in 2010
ICT
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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24. This also is compounded by the fact that some public-sector establishments can’t be removed from the NETS dataset, which is more likely to be the case in the 
miscellaneous activities of high-tech (particularly aerospace and scientific research and development) relative to the ICT segment of high-tech.
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Table 2: Top 25 Metros for ICT High-Tech Startup Density (2010)
Metro Name Density Metro Name Density
Boulder, CO 6.1 Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 1.9
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 2.9 Austin-Round Rock, TX 1.8
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 2.7 Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 1.8
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 2.6 Huntsville, AL 1.7
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 2.6 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1.7
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 2.5 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 1.6
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 2.5 Corvallis, OR 1.6
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA 2.3 Cheyenne, WY 1.6
Colorado Springs, CO 2.2 Bethesda-Frederick-Rockville, MD 1.5
Raleigh-Cary, NC 2.1 Ames, IA 1.5
Provo-Orem, UT 2.1 Boise City-Nampa, ID 1.5
Salt Lake City, UT 1.9 Manchester-Nashua, NH 1.5
Missoula, MT 1.9 36 Additional Metros > 1.0 --
United States 1.0 United States 1.0
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
ICT	high-tech	firms	nationwide.	For	example,	
Missoula,	Mont.,	had	sixteen	ICT	startups	in	2010	
while	there	were	eleven	each	in	Corvallis,	Ore.,	
Cheyenne, Wyo., and Ames, Iowa. In addition to the 
top	twenty-five,	another	thirty-six	metros	had	ICT	
high-tech startup densities greater than the average 
for the United States overall. For comparison, the 
largest twenty-five metros in terms of absolute level 
of ICT startups constituted about 40 percent of all 
such new businesses in 2010.
	 Overall,	Figures	7	and	8	and	Tables	1	and	2	show	
that high-tech and ICT startups are being founded 
throughout the United States. They are forming 
in well-known tech hubs, in communities tied to 
technology-focused industries like aerospace and 
defense or research universities, and in large and 
small cities alike. While prior research would indicate 
that this isn’t too surprising, in a few places the 
magnitude of these densities might be.
	 One	additional	finding	that	points	to	what’s	ahead	
is that the distribution of higher-density regions 
encompasses a wider group of metros over time. As 
we saw before, seventy-eight metros had high-tech 
startup densities above the U.S. average in 2010. 
But	in	1990,	only	sixty-seven	did.	The	same	is	true	
of	ICT,	where	sixty-one	metros	had	higher-than-
average startup densities in 2010 compared with 
fifty	in	1990.	Figures	A5	and	A6	in	Appendix	2	show	
that the distribution of startup densities has become 
less polarized and more evenly spread over time. The 
maps	in	Appendix	3	further	illustrate	this	point	by	
comparing startup density measures for high-tech 
and	ICT	in	1990	against	2010.
 What’s interesting is that the opposite is true for 
firms across the entire private sector—above-average 
densities	exist	in	fewer	metros	today	relative	to	two	
decades ago.25 
25. Twenty-two percent of metros in 1990 versus 15 percent in 2010. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics.
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Startup Growth
 Now that we have established where high-tech 
and ICT startups are most concentrated, we can 
examine	where	annual	growth	occurs	over	time.	
To get a better understanding of this, we analyze 
the relationship between high-tech or ICT startup 
density in a given year, and the percentage change 
in the number of such startups in the same region 
five or ten years later. Since our data spans twenty 
years, this allows us to look at fifteen periods worth 
of data for five-year growth rates, and ten periods 
worth for ten-year growth rates.
 First, however, we display this relationship visually 
by plotting the results for the latest periods of our 
data.	Figure	9	shows	the	relationship	between	
the startup density in a region in 2005, and the 
subsequent five-year change in startup levels in 
that same region in 2010. It also shows the same 
relationship using 2000 as a base year and the 
subsequent ten-year period ending in 2010.
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Figure 9: Relationship Between Startup Density and Startup Growth
Kauffman Foundation
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Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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 It’s clear that there is a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the two base years 
and the subsequent periods of growth, both for 
high-tech	and	ICT.	On	average,	the	regions	that	
experienced	the	highest	rates	of	growth	had	
relatively lower levels of high-tech or ICT startup 
density in the base year. The higher percent changes 
in lower density regions partially reflects the fact 
that they are working from smaller bases, but it is 
also true that many regions are playing catch-up as 
the production of technology goods and services 
is increasingly possible in a more dispersed set of 
locations.
	 Next,	to	estimate	this	relationship	over	the	
entire period of our data, we implement a simple 
linear regression. After doing so, we find that a 
statistically	significant	negative	relationship	exists	
between startup density and subsequent growth.26 
This means that, on average, regions with lower 
high-tech	and	ICT	startup	densities	exhibited	higher	
rates of subsequent growth. Again, though in many 
cases lower-density areas were working from smaller 
bases, these higher growth rates would indicate 
that high-tech and ICT startups are dispersing 
geographically.
 As was hinted at before, this relationship is the 
opposite across the private sector as a whole, where 
growth in new firms historically has occurred in 
regions with an already higher share of new firm 
density. The reasons for the difference between 
high-tech and the entire private sector aren’t 
immediately clear, but could be an important area 
for future research.
Conclusions
	 Job	creation	and	business	formation	dynamics	
in the innovative high-tech and ICT sectors differ 
from	new	and	young	businesses	as	a	whole.	High-
tech and ICT firms have played outsized roles in 
entrepreneurship in the United States, as business 
formation rates and new firm growth have far 
outpaced those for firms across the entire economy 
during the last few decades.
 Though they start small, young high-tech and ICT 
firms tend to grow especially rapidly in the early 
years—so rapidly, in fact, that job creation is robust 
enough to outshine the job destruction from early-
stage business failures. The same cannot be said of 
new firms broadly, where net job destruction in the 
early and middle years is substantial.
 After removing the job destruction from firm 
closures, the net job creation rate of surviving young 
high-tech and ICT firms is still more than twice that 
of businesses across the economy. This job creation 
is reflected in employment levels where the average 
employment at high-tech and ICT firms surpasses 
those across the private sector as a whole, starting 
with the early years.
 Turning to the regional dimensions of 
entrepreneurship, high-tech and ICT business 
formations have been occurring across the United 
States in geographically and economically diverse 
regions.	High-tech	startups	have	been	popping	up	
in major tech hubs, in big cities, and in smaller ones. 
They have been growing in the Rocky Mountains, 
West Coast, Sunbelt, Midwest, Southeast, Mid-
Atlantic,	Northeast,	and	Great	Plains.	For	the	
top regions, high-tech startup activity also has 
been concentrated in smaller cities with a known 
aerospace and defense presence, as well as in 
communities with major research universities.
 Though the major metros and tech hubs were 
responsible for the substantial majority of high-
tech and ICT startup levels, relatively speaking, the 
importance	of	smaller	regions	has	grown.	High-
tech startup growth rates have been strongest, 
on average, in regions with lower densities. The 
opposite has been true for firms across the entire 
private sector, where new firm formations have 
been concentrated in regions with already higher 
levels of entrepreneurship.
 The broad-based growth in high-tech startups 
is encouraging because entrepreneurship is 
good for the economy. The disruptive process of 
entrepreneurship and business churning, while 
potentially costly in the short-term, is an important 
source of productivity growth for the U.S. economy 
26. Using OLS, we regress the five- or ten-year growth in startup levels in a region on the startup density in the base year as well as dummies for each base year (1990 
to 2005, or 1990 to 2010) to account for changes over time.
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overall.27 The presence of entrepreneurship in a 
region has been consistently linked with measures 
of economic development, such as employment 
growth.28 
 It is reasonable to believe that this effect is 
especially strong for high-tech startups. For 
example,	the	presence	of	venture	capital-backed	
firms in a region has been causally linked with 
greater employment growth and income generation 
in the same region, aside from the companies 
that receive venture funding.29 Research shows 
that the creation of one high-tech job in a region 
is associated with the creation of more than four 
additional jobs in the local services economy of 
the same region in the long run.30	High-tech	firms	
also	are	responsible	for	about	60	percent	of	private	
sector R&D spending, which has important local 
spillovers.31 
	 Looking	ahead,	the	next	few	years	of	data	
releases will provide critical insights into the state 
of economic dynamism and entrepreneurship 
in the United States. There is no doubt that the 
decline in firm starts in recent years is largely due 
to a historic economic recession. But there also are 
signs that declining business dynamism may have 
played a role as well. While it is too soon to tell 
based on this evidence alone, this is an important 
development to watch for in the coming years. Let’s 
hope that 2011 was the beginning of a sustained 
revival in technology entrepreneurship, and 
entrepreneurship overall.
27. Haltiwanger (2011), “Job Creation and Firm Dynamics in the U.S.,” Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 12, NBER.
28. Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2013), “Entrepreneurship and Urban Growth: An Empirical Assessment with Historical Mines,” NBER Working Paper 18333; Glaeser, 
Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010), “Clusters of Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Urban Economics 67:1 (2010), 150–168; Delgado, Porter, and Stern (2010), “Clusters and 
Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Economic Geography 10:4 (2010a), 495–518.
29. Samila and Sorenson (2011), “Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth,” Review of Economics and Statistics 93:1, 338–349.
30. Hathaway (2012), “Technology Works: High-Tech Employment and Wages in the United States,” Bay Area Council Economic Institute.
31. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010 Research and Development Satellite Account, Table 5.1, Private Businesses Investment in R&D by Industry, 1987–2007.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Defining High-Tech
 According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study 
published in 2005 that followed an interagency 
seminar aimed at classifying high-tech industries, 
a high-tech industry is defined by the presence 
of four factors: a high proportion of scientists, 
engineers,	and	technicians;	a	high	proportion	of	
R&D	employment;	production	of	high-tech	products,	
as specified on a Census Bureau list of advanced-
technology	products;	and	the	use	of	high-tech	
production methods, including intense use of high-
tech capital goods and services in the production 
process.32 
 The study also concluded that because of “data 
and conceptual problems,” the intensity of “science, 
engineering, and technician” employment would  
 
 
be the basis for identifying high-tech industries. 
Seventy-six	“technology-oriented	occupations”	were	
used to conduct the employment intensity analysis. 
A condensed list is outlined in Table 3, but broadly 
speaking, these occupations coalesce around three 
groups—computer	and	math	scientists;	engineers,	
drafters	and	surveyors;	and	physical	and	life	
scientists.33 
 After this group of occupations was identified, 
an intensity analysis was conducted to determine 
which industries contained large shares of these 
technology-oriented	workers.	Of	the	more	than	
300 industries at the level of granularity used, 
the fourteen shown in Table 4 had the highest 
concentrations of technology-oriented workers. 
Each of these fourteen “Level-1” industries had 
concentrations of high-tech employment at least five 
times the average across industries.34
SOC Code Occupation
Computer and Math Sciences
11-3020 Computer and information systems managers
15-0000 Computer and mathematical scientists
Engineering and Related
11-9040 Engineering managers
17-2000 Engineers
17-3000 Drafters, engineering, and mapping technicians
Physical and Life Sciences
11-9120 Natural sciences managers
19-1000 Life scientists
19-2000 Physical scientists
19-4000 Life, physical, and social science technicians
Table 3: Technology-Oriented Occupations
32. Daniel E. Hecker, “High-technology employment: a NAICS-based update,” Monthly Labor Review (U.S. Dept. of Labor and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), 
Volume 128, Number 7, July 2005: 58.
33. For the detailed list, see Table 3 in Hecker, “High-technology employment: a NAICS-based update,” 63.
34. See the Level-I Industries section of Table 1 in Hecker, “High-technology employment: a NAICS-based update,” 60.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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NAICS Code Industry
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) High-Tech
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component 
manufacturing
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control 
instruments manufacturing
5112 Software publishers
5161 Internet publishing and broadcasting
5179 Other telecommunications
5181 Internet service providers and Web search portals
5182 Data processing, hosting, and related services
5415 Computer systems design and related services
Miscellaneous High-Tech
3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing
3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing
5413 Architectural, engineering, and related services
5417 Scientific research-and-development services
Table 4: High-Technology Industries
 This report uses the method described above to 
define the high-tech sector of the U.S. economy. 
Checks were made to ensure that the identifying 
conditions held in the latest available data, 
and crosswalks were performed to account for 
changes in industry and occupation classifications 
over time. Though the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
report ultimately concluded that a wider group of 
industries could be considered high-tech, this report 
uses a more conservative approach by analyzing 
just the fourteen Level-1 industries with very high 
concentrations of technology-oriented workers in 
the STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, 
and math.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Appendix 2: Miscellaneous Charts
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Fig. A1: Distribution of Employment by Firm Age (1990–2011)
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Figure A1: Distribution of Employment by Firm Age (1990–2011)
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Figure A2: Distribution of Firms Age (1990–2011)
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Figure A3: Three-Year Survival Rate by Birth Year (1980–2008 Births)
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Figure A4: Five-Year Survival Rate by Birth Year (1980–2006 Births)
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Fig. A5: Distribution of Metro High-Tech Startups Densities (1990 and 2010)
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Figure A5: Distribution of Metro High-Tech Startups Densities (1990 and 2010)
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Fig. A6: Distribution of Metro ICT Startups Densities (1990 and 2010)
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Figure A6: Distribution of Metro ICT Startups Densities (1990 and 2010)
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Appendix 3: High-Tech and ICT Startup Density by Metro Area
Appendix 3: High-Tech Startup Density by Metro Area
2010
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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Appendix 3: ICT Startup Density by Metro Area
2010
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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Appendix 4: High-Tech and ICT Business Formations by Metro Area
United States 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Abilene, TX 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2
Akron, OH 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7
Albany, GA 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3
Albany-Schenectady-
Troy, NY
0.7 0.7 0.4 0.8
Albuquerque, NM 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.8
Alexandria, LA 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2
Allentown-Bethlehem-
Easton, PA-NJ
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
Altoona, PA 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Amarillo, TX 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2
Ames, IA 0.7 1.6 1.1 1.5
Anchorage, AK 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.7
Anderson, IN 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Anderson, SC 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1
Ann Arbor, MI 2.6 1.4 2.9 1.1
Anniston-Oxford, AL 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4
Appleton, WI 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5
Asheville, NC 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.0
Athens-Clarke County, 
GA
0.4 0.6 0.3 0.7
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-
Marietta, GA
1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
Atlantic City-
Hammonton, NJ
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
Auburn-Opelika, AL 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.2
Augusta-Richmond 
County, GA-SC
0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3
Austin-Round Rock, TX 2.3 1.7 1.9 1.8
Bakersfield, CA 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
Baltimore-Towson, MD 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
Bangor, ME 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.9
Barnstable Town, MA 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.8
Baton Rouge, LA 0.6 1.4 0.3 1.0
Battle Creek, MI 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Bay City, MI 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.2
Beaumont-Port Arthur, 
TX
0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
Bellingham, WA 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.7
Bend, OR 0.8 1.8 0.2 1.3
Bethesda-Frederick-
Rockville, MD
2.4 1.7 2.4 1.5
Billings, MT 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.6
Binghamton, NY 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7
Bismarck, ND 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.0
Blacksburg-
Christiansburg-Radford, 
VA
0.4 0.7 0.2 0.5
Bloomington, IN 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.6
Bloomington-Normal, IL 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.9
Boise City-Nampa, ID 0.7 1.3 0.3 1.5
Boston-Quincy, MA 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1
Boulder, CO 4.0 6.3 4.7 6.1
Bowling Green, KY 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
Bradenton-Sarasota-
Venice, FL
0.8 1.0 0.4 0.8
Bremerton-Silverdale, 
WA
1.1 0.7 0.5 0.6
Bridgeport-Stamford-
Norwalk, CT
1.4 0.9 1.6 1.1
Brownsville-Harlingen, 
TX
0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
Brunswick, GA 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.5
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, 
NY
0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4
Burlington, NC 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3
Burlington-South 
Burlington, VT
0.9 1.3 0.4 1.1
Cambridge-Newton-
Framingham, MA
2.0 2.4 2.0 2.3
Camden, NJ 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Canton-Massillon, OH 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.5
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, 
FL
0.8 0.7 0.4 0.5
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Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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Cape Girardeau-Jackson, 
MO-IL
0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Carson City, NV 0.5 1.2 0.5 1.4
Casper, WY 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.7
Cedar Rapids, IA 0.6 1.0 0.3 1.4
Champaign-Urbana, IL 0.4 1.2 0.2 1.5
Charleston, WV 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5
Charleston-North 
Charleston-Summerville, 
SC
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4
Charlotte-Gastonia-
Concord, NC-SC
0.9 1.2 0.6 1.3
Charlottesville, VA 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.8
Chattanooga, TN-GA 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3
Cheyenne, WY 0.5 2.0 0.2 1.6
Chicago-Naperville-
Joliet, IL
1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2
Chico, CA 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2
Cincinnati-Middletown, 
OH-KY-IN
0.6 0.8 0.5 0.9
Clarksville, TN-KY 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2
Cleveland, TN 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, 
OH
0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
Coeur d’Alene, ID 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.8
College Station-Bryan, 
TX
0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6
Colorado Springs, CO 1.2 2.3 1.4 2.2
Columbia, MO 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4
Columbia, SC 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4
Columbus, GA-AL 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Columbus, IN 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.7
Columbus, OH 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.2
Corpus Christi, TX 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1
Corvallis, OR 0.7 2.0 0.2 1.6
Cumberland, MD-WV 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 2.1 1.3 2.7 1.4
Dalton, GA 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.6
Danville, IL 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
Danville, VA 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Davenport-Moline-Rock 
Island, IA-IL
0.3 0.6 0.2 0.5
Dayton, OH 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8
Decatur, AL 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.4
Decatur, IL 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0
Deltona-Daytona Beach-
Ormond Beach, FL
0.7 0.7 0.3 0.6
Denver-Aurora-
Broomfield, CO
1.8 2.4 1.7 2.5
Des Moines-West Des 
Moines, IA
0.9 1.4 0.9 1.9
Detroit-Livonia-
Dearborn, MI
0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4
Dothan, AL 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
Dover, DE 0.2 1.0 0.0 1.1
Dubuque, IA 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4
Duluth, MN-WI 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 0.9 1.6 0.7 1.6
Eau Claire, WI 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2
Edison-New Brunswick, 
NJ
1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4
El Centro, CA 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2
Elizabethtown, KY 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3
Elmira, NY 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
El Paso, TX 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Erie, PA 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3
Eugene-Springfield, OR 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.8
Evansville, IN-KY 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3
Fairbanks, AK 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.4
Fargo, ND-MN 0.4 1.0 0.1 1.0
Farmington, NM 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.1
Fayetteville, NC 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4
Fayetteville-Springdale-
Rogers, AR-MO
0.4 1.0 0.1 0.6
Flagstaff, AZ 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3
Flint, MI 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
Florence, SC 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
Florence-Muscle Shoals, 
AL
0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2
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Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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Fond du Lac, WI 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2
Fort Collins-Loveland, 
CO
1.2 3.0 1.1 2.6
Fort Lauderdale-
Pompano Beach-
Deerfield Beach, FL
1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2
Fort Smith, AR-OK 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2
Fort Walton Beach-
Crestview-Destin, FL
0.2 0.9 0.0 1.0
Fort Wayne, IN 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.6
Fresno, CA 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Gadsden, AL 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3
Gainesville, FL 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.5
Gainesville, GA 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.4
Gary, IN 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2
Glens Falls, NY 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.3
Goldsboro, NC 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Grand Forks, ND-MN 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
Grand Junction, CO 1.1 1.7 0.0 1.2
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, 
MI
0.9 0.5 0.7 0.5
Great Falls, MT 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
Greeley, CO 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.6
Green Bay, WI 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.6
Greensboro-High Point, 
NC
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
Greenville, NC 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5
Greenville-Mauldin-
Easley, SC
0.9 0.8 0.4 0.6
Gulfport-Biloxi, MS 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, 
MD-WV
0.5 0.6 0.0 0.6
Hanford-Corcoran, CA 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7
Harrisonburg, VA 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.3
Hartford-West Hartford-
East Hartford, CT
0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7
Hattiesburg, MS 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1
Hickory-Lenoir-
Morganton, NC
0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Hinesville-Fort Stewart, 
GA
0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1
Holland-Grand Haven, 
MI
1.3 0.4 0.9 0.3
Honolulu, HI 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.0
Hot Springs, AR 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2
Houma-Bayou Cane-
Thibodaux, LA
0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3
Houston-Sugar Land-
Baytown, TX
1.9 0.9 1.5 0.7
Huntington-Ashland, 
WV-KY-OH
0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Huntsville, AL 1.7 1.9 1.0 1.7
Idaho Falls, ID 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.9
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.9
Iowa City, IA 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.7
Ithaca, NY 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.6
Jackson, MI 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2
Jackson, MS 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4
Jackson, TN 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
Jacksonville, FL 0.6 1.2 0.3 1.0
Jacksonville, NC 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.7
Janesville, WI 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
Jefferson City, MO 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.6
Johnson City, TN 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.3
Johnstown, PA 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.7
Jonesboro, AR 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Joplin, MO 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5
Kankakee-Bradley, IL 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5
Kansas City, MO-KS 0.6 1.3 0.5 1.5
Kennewick-Pasco-
Richland, WA
0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3
Killeen-Temple-Fort 
Hood, TX
0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, 
TN-VA
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1
Kingston, NY 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5
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Knoxville, TN 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5
Kokomo, IN 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.8
La Crosse, WI-MN 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1
Lafayette, IN 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
Lafayette, LA 1.1 1.4 0.2 0.7
Lake Charles, LA 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.4
Lake County-Kenosha 
County, IL-WI
1.0 1.2 0.7 1.5
Lake Havasu City-
Kingman, AZ
0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
Lakeland-Winter Haven, 
FL
0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3
Lancaster, PA 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.6
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3
Laredo, TX 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.2
Las Cruces, NM 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.3
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.9
Lawrence, KS 0.6 1.2 0.5 1.2
Lawton, OK 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Lebanon, PA 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3
Lewiston, ID-WA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lewiston-Auburn, ME 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.5
Lexington-Fayette, KY 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.9
Lima, OH 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
Lincoln, NE 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5
Little Rock-North Little 
Rock-Conway, AR
0.6 1.1 0.3 1.1
Logan, UT-ID 0.5 1.0 0.1 0.7
Longview, TX 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2
Longview, WA 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3
Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Glendale, CA
0.9 0.7 1.1 0.6
Louisville/Jefferson 
County, KY-IN
0.4 0.9 0.4 0.9
Lubbock, TX 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.4
Lynchburg, VA 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.3
Macon, GA 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3
Madera-Chowchilla, CA 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1
Madison, WI 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.1
Manchester-Nashua, NH 3.2 1.6 4.0 1.5
Manhattan, KS 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.3
Mankato-North 
Mankato, MN
0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3
Mansfield, OH 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3
McAllen-Edinburg-
Mission, TX
0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
Medford, OR 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.7
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3
Merced, CA 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Miami-Miami Beach-
Kendall, FL
1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8
Michigan City-La Porte, 
IN
0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1
Midland, TX 1.4 0.7 0.0 0.3
Milwaukee-Waukesha-
West Allis, WI
1.0 0.6 0.9 0.7
Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN-WI
1.4 1.1 1.5 1.3
Missoula, MT 0.7 1.7 0.3 1.9
Mobile, AL 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.5
Modesto, CA 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
Monroe, LA 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.2
Monroe, MI 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1
Montgomery, AL 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.6
Morgantown, WV 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.4
Morristown, TN 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
Mount Vernon-
Anacortes, WA
0.8 0.6 0.2 0.5
Muncie, IN 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
Muskegon-Norton 
Shores, MI
0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Myrtle Beach-North 
Myrtle Beach-Conway, 
SC
0.8 0.5 0.0 0.3
Napa, CA 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
Naples-Marco Island, FL 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.6
Nashville-Davidson--
Murfreesboro--Franklin, 
TN
0.7 0.7 0.4 0.6
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 1.2 0.7 1.4 0.7
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Newark-Union, NJ-PA 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.7
New Haven-Milford, CT 1.1 0.5 1.2 0.5
New Orleans-Metairie-
Kenner, LA
0.6 1.3 0.4 0.9
New York-White Plains-
Wayne, NY-NJ
0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2
Norwich-New London, 
CT
1.1 0.8 1.1 0.9
Oakland-Fremont-
Hayward, CA
1.5 1.1 1.8 1.1
Ocala, FL 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.2
Ocean City, NJ 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.4
Odessa, TX 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.8
Oklahoma City, OK 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6
Olympia, WA 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.5
Omaha-Council Bluffs, 
NE-IA
0.8 1.1 0.6 0.9
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.0
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4
Owensboro, KY 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-
Ventura, CA
1.4 0.9 1.5 0.8
Palm Bay-Melbourne-
Titusville, FL
1.5 1.2 1.2 0.8
Palm Coast, FL 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.7
Panama City-Lynn 
Haven-Panama City 
Beach, FL
0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4
Parkersburg-Marietta-
Vienna, WV-OH
0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Pascagoula, MS 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
Peabody, MA 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-
Brent, FL
0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4
Peoria, IL 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Philadelphia, PA 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Phoenix-Mesa-
Scottsdale, AZ
1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3
Pine Bluff, AR 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
Pittsburgh, PA 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8
Pittsfield, MA 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3
Pocatello, ID 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.1
Portland-South Portland-
Biddeford, ME
1.0 1.1 0.7 1.5
Portland-Vancouver-
Beaverton, OR-WA
1.3 1.6 1.2 1.7
Port St. Lucie, FL 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7
Poughkeepsie-
Newburgh-Middletown, 
NY
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Prescott, AZ 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2
Providence-New 
Bedford-Fall River, 
RI-MA
0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
Provo-Orem, UT 1.4 1.9 1.7 2.1
Pueblo, CO 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4
Punta Gorda, FL 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.3
Racine, WI 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.6
Raleigh-Cary, NC 1.8 1.9 1.4 2.1
Rapid City, SD 0.6 1.2 0.2 1.0
Reading, PA 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
Redding, CA 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4
Reno-Sparks, NV 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.8
Richmond, VA 0.5 1.0 0.4 1.1
Riverside-San 
Bernardino-Ontario, CA
0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3
Roanoke, VA 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.5
Rochester, MN 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Rochester, NY 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
Rockford, IL 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4
Rockingham County-
Strafford County, NH
2.1 1.4 1.7 1.4
Rocky Mount, NC 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2
Rome, GA 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.6
Sacramento--Arden-
Arcade--Roseville, CA
0.8 0.8 0.4 0.7
Saginaw-Saginaw 
Township North, MI
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1
St. Cloud, MN 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
High-Tech 
Startup 
Density
ICT Startup 
Density
Metro 1990 2010 1990 2010
High-Tech 
Startup 
Density
ICT Startup 
Density
Metro 1990 2010 1990 2010
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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St. George, UT 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.7
St. Joseph, MO-KS 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.1
St. Louis, MO-IL 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7
Salem, OR 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5
Salinas, CA 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4
Salisbury, MD 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Salt Lake City, UT 1.6 2.0 1.4 1.9
San Angelo, TX 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.2
San Antonio, TX 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6
San Diego-Carlsbad-San 
Marcos, CA
1.5 1.2 1.6 1.0
Sandusky, OH 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3
San Francisco-San 
Mateo-Redwood City, 
CA
2.1 2.4 2.6 2.5
San Jose-Sunnyvale-
Santa Clara, CA
3.0 2.6 4.4 2.9
San Luis Obispo-Paso 
Robles, CA
0.8 1.0 0.3 0.8
Santa Ana-Anaheim-
Irvine, CA
1.9 1.3 2.1 1.1
Santa Barbara-Santa 
Maria-Goleta, CA
1.4 0.9 1.0 0.6
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, 
CA
1.5 0.9 1.7 0.8
Santa Fe, NM 1.2 1.6 0.2 1.2
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, 
CA
1.0 0.7 0.8 0.6
Savannah, GA 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, 
PA
0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, 
WA
1.7 2.4 1.9 2.7
Sebastian-Vero Beach, 
FL
1.3 0.8 0.0 0.4
Sheboygan, WI 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sherman-Denison, TX 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
Shreveport-Bossier City, 
LA
0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5
Sioux City, IA-NE-SD 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4
Sioux Falls, SD 0.4 1.7 0.3 1.0
South Bend-Mishawaka, 
IN-MI
0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3
Spartanburg, SC 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3
Spokane, WA 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.8
Springfield, IL 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.7
Springfield, MA 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Springfield, MO 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.5
Springfield, OH 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.3
State College, PA 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.8
Stockton, CA 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sumter, SC 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Syracuse, NY 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4
Tacoma, WA 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5
Tallahassee, FL 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.8
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL
1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
Terre Haute, IN 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2
Texarkana, 
TX-Texarkana, AR
0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2
Toledo, OH 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2
Topeka, KS 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.2
Tucson, AZ 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5
Tulsa, OK 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8
Tuscaloosa, AL 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4
Tyler, TX 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3
Utica-Rome, NY 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2
Valdosta, GA 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3
Victoria, TX 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Vineland-Millville-
Bridgeton, NJ
0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News, VA-NC
0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8
Visalia-Porterville, CA 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Waco, TX 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2
Warner Robins, GA 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.6
Warren-Troy-Farmington 
Hills, MI
1.5 0.8 1.3 0.7
High-Tech 
Startup 
Density
ICT Startup 
Density
Metro 1990 2010 1990 2010
High-Tech 
Startup 
Density
ICT Startup 
Density
Metro 1990 2010 1990 2010
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-
WV
1.8 2.3 1.9 2.6
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Wausau, WI 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1
Weirton-Steubenville, 
WV-OH
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Wenatchee-East 
Wenatchee, WA
0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4
West Palm Beach-Boca 
Raton-Boynton Beach, 
FL
1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0
Wheeling, WV-OH 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1
Wichita, KS 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6
Wichita Falls, TX 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2
Williamsport, PA 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 0.9 1.6 0.3 1.8
Wilmington, NC 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.7
Winchester, VA-WV 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.4
Winston-Salem, NC 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.7
Worcester, MA 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9
Yakima, WA 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
York-Hanover, PA 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4
Youngstown-Warren-
Boardman, OH-PA
0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5
Yuba City, CA 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2
Yuma, AZ 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.2
Source: National Employment Time Series (NETS), Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations
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